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end, two changes should be made in the statute, for in its present state it is
doubtful that any attorney would jeopardize a responsible parent's job by
seeking to garnish his wages because of the potentially counterproductive
nature of such an action. First, provision must be made for compensation to
the employer for the increased bookkeeping expense that accompanies a
continuing garnishment order. Secondly, a severe penalty should be as-
sessed against discharging an employee because of a garnishment.6 5 Until
such action is taken, decreases in welfare expenditures and increased assur-
ance of support to dependents will never be realized, and an essential
support enforcement remedy will continue to lay dormant.
MICHAEL ANDREW HEEDY
Taxation-Part A Medicare Benefits Under
the Dependency Support Test
Section 152(a) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code' permits a taxpayer
to claim a qualified individual as a dependent if the taxpayer has provided
more than half of that individual's total support during the taxable year.
2
65: In addition, although not discussed at length herein, the 20% maximum provided by §
110-136(a) should be raised to a level that will adequately reflect the economic needs of
abandoned dependents. See note 55 supra. The ceiling placed on wage garnishment by the
Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, see note 52 supra, is inapplicable to garnishment
actions for support. 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(1) (1970).
1. I.R.C. § 152(a).
2. Section 152 provides in pertinent part:
(a) GENERAL DEFINITION-For purposes of this subtitle, the term "dependent"
means any of the following individuals over half of whose support, for the calender
year in which the taxable year of the taxpayer begins, was received from the taxpayer
i4i The father or mother of the taxpayer, or an ancestor of either,
(8) A son-in-law, daughter-in-law, father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother-in-law,
or sister-in-law of the taxpayer ....
Id. Treas. Reg. § 1.152-1(a)(2)(i), T.D. 6231, 1957-1 C.B. 77, 83, adds:
For purposes of determining whether or not an individual received, for a given
calendar year, over half of his support from the taxpayer, there shall be taken into
account the amount of support received from the taxpayer as compared to the entire
amount of support which the individual received from all sources, including support
which the individual himself supplied. The term "support" includes food, shelter,
clothing, medical and dental care, education, and the like.
Id. The burden of proof is on the taxpayer to establish not only the amount of his or her
contribution but also that it constitutes more than half of the individual's total support. E.g.,
Rose D. Serayder, 50 T.C. 756, 760 (1968), acq. 1969-2 C.B. xxv; Aaron F. Vance, 36 T.C. 547,
549 (1961). For discussion of dependency support, see Krawchick, Who Is Dependent? Whose
Dependent? What Is Support?, 29 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. FED. TAX. 1343 (1971); [1975] 1 TAX
COORDINATOR (RIA) A-3100 to -3120.
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Under this dependency support test, some government benefits disbursed on
behalf of the individual may raise troublesome analytical problems in
determining whether such benefits should be included in computing the total
amount of support provided the individual. Despite a Treasury regulation
that directs the inclusion of social security benefits as amounts contributed
by the recipient for his or her own support3 and the consistent treatment of
other social welfare disbursements as support, 4 clear principles for deter-
mining section 152(a) status of other government benefits have not yet
crystallized. In Turecamo v. Commissioner,5 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit confronted the question whether Medicare
hospitalization benefits paid pursuant to Part A of Subchapter XVIII of the
Social Security Act (Part A benefits)6 should be considered support provided
by the beneficiary for section 152(a) purposes. The court answered the
question by concluding that Part A benefits were excludible from dependen-
cy support computations. 7
During most of the taxable year in question (1970), the Medicare
beneficiary, Mrs. Kavanaugh, lived with the taxpayers, her son-in-law and
daughter. Mrs. Kavanaugh incurred a hospital bill that year totaling
$11,095.75. Part A Medicare allowances paid $10,434.75 of that bill. The
taxpayers paid the balance as well as other medical expenses incurred by
Mrs. Kavanaugh. In all, the taxpayers paid a total of $3,531 in medical
expenses and approximately $4000 for other support items on Mrs.
Kavanaugh's behalf.8 Mrs. Kavanaugh also received $1140 in social securi-
ty benefits, which she applied toward her own support. The taxpayers,
assuming that they had provided Mrs. Kavanaugh more than half her
3. Treas. Reg. § 1.152-1(a)(2)(ii), T.D. 6231, 1957-1 C.B. 77, 83.
4. See, e.g., Eli C. Leggett, 45 T.C.M. (P-H) 20 (1976) (state medical assistance payments
and state-federal AFDC payments); Hiram Johnson, 43 TC.M. (P-H) 619 (1974) (state welfare
payments); Glenn W. Kincheloe, 40 T.C.M. (P-H) 161 (1971) (disability payments); H.B.
House, 28 T.C.M. (P-H) 191 (1959) (maintenance in state mental hospital); John L. Donner, 25
T.C. 1043 (1956) (support of invalid child in state school); Rev. Rul. 74-543, 1974-2 C.B. 39
(social security benefit payments to the child of a disabled parent); Rev. Rul. 74-153, 1974-1
C.B. 20 (state payments to adoptive parents for necessary support of their adopted children).
5. 554 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1977). For a summary of the Second Circuit's opinion, see
Medicare "Part A " Payments Are Not Support for Purpose of Determining Dependency Deduc-
tion Taken by Recipient's Children, [1977-I] U.S. TAX WEEK (Bender) 676; Second Circuit Says
Basic Medicare Isn't Support, [1977] 48 FED. TAXES (P-H) 60,249.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c to 1395i-2 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Although Medicare is a part of
the larger social security system, benefits disbursed under Medicare should be distinguished
from "social security benefits." The latter term is popularly used to describe only benefits
disbursed under the old-age, survivors, and disability program, id. §§ 401-432. See COMMERCE
CLEARING HOUSE, MEDICARE AND SOCIAL SECURITY EXPLAINED 15 (1976).
7. 554 F.2d at 566.
8. Id. at 567.
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support during the taxable year, 9 claimed an additional dependency exemp-
tion10 and included the amount they spent paying Mrs. Kavanaugh's medical
bills as part of their own deductible medical expenses.
1I
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue ruled, however, that the Part A
benefits paid on Mrs. Kavanaugh's behalf had to be included as part of her
contribution to her own support. 12 In so ruling, the Commissioner relied on
a previous revenue ruling 13 that prescribed this treatment of Part A benefits
in accordance with traditional section 152(a) treatment of social insurance
and welfare disbursements. 14 As a result of the Commissioner's ruling, the
taxpayers failed to establish that they had provided more than half of Mrs.
Kavanaugh's support for the taxable year. 15 Hence, their additional personal
exemption and medical expense deduction were denied and a tax deficiency
was assessed. The Tax Court subsequently overruled the Commissioner
with regard to section 152(a) treatment of the Part A benefits and allowed
the taxpayers' dependency claims.
16
In affirming the Tax Court's decision, the Second Circuit based its
holding on two independent grounds. - First, the court found that Part A
benefits were indistinguishable for section 152(a) purposes from sums
disbursed under both Part B Medicare insurance 17 and private health insur-
ance, which have been held excludible from dependency support computa-
tions. 18 On this basis, it determined that Part A benefits should not be treated
differently from proceeds paid under these other insurance plans. Second,
the court concluded that the Part A benefits had no "economic impact" on
Mrs. Kavanaugh's financial relationship with the taxpayers. 19 In other
words, the court stated, receipt of the Medicare benefits did not alter the
established economic relationship between Mrs. Kavanaugh and the taxpay-
9. Including the $10,434.75 in Part A benefits as support, the taxpayers would.have
provided only $7,531, approximately 40% of $19,105.75 spent in total support payments for
Mrs. Kavanaugh. Disregarding those benefits for § 152(a) purposes, Mrs. Kavanaugh's total
support payments amounted to only $8,671, and the taxpayers' contribution constituted well
over half of that total. Id.
10. I.R.C. § 151(e) allows the taxpayer to take additional personal exemptions as deduc-
tions for qualified dependents.
11. 554 F.2d at 567. I.R.C. § 213(a) permits the taxpayer to include the medical expenses
of qualified dependents in medical deduction computations.
12. 554 F.2d at 567.
13. Rev. Rul. 70-341, 1970-2 C.B. 31.
14. The Commissioner, holding that Part A Medicare benefits should be treated as support
under this broad social welfare rubric, stated that they were "in the nature of disbursements
made in furtherance of the social welfare objectives of the Federal government" and were "not
legally distinguishable" from monthly social security payments. Id.
15. See note 9 supra.
16. Turecamo v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 720 (1975).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395j-1395w (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
18. See text accompanying notes 39-41 infra.
19. 554 F.2d at 568.
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ers, who regularly paid the bulk of her normal living expenses as well as
medical expenses that she herself would otherwise have had to pay.
20
Full comprehension of Turecamo and its significance requires a funda-
mental understanding of the Medicare system. 2' Created in 1965,22 Medi-
care was instituted to provide a comprehensive approach to health insurance
for the aged. 23 It has been asserted that the two substantive parts of the
Medicare statutory scheme, Parts A and B, provide more comprehensive
and complex coverage than many of the medical insurance plans underwrit-
ten by private insurers.24 Part A furnishes basic hospitalization insurance to
all persons entitled to payments either under federal old-age, survivors, and
disability insurance or under the railroad retirement system325 This service is
paid for from a trust fund that is financed by a compulsory payroll tax on
employees' wages, by an employers excise tax, and by a tax on earnings of
self-employers. 26 This financing method is calculated to make the trust fund
actuarially sound and self-supporting.27 Part B28 of the Medicare system
provides supplementary health services, including payment for physicians'
care. 29 Part B coverage is available to persons eligible to participate in the
Part A program and to other qualified United States residents aged sixty-five
or older.30 The Part B program is financed by monthly premiums paid by the
participants l and by matching government contributions from the general
revenues. 32 These sums are deposited into a separate trust fund. 3
Thus, both substantive parts of the Medicare system constitute hybrid
forms of insurance. For instance, the Part A provisions contain elements of
private health insurance-periodic payments for specified protection against
20. Id. at 576.
21. For discussion of Medicare, see COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, supra note 6, at 189-
393; R. STEVENS & R. STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA 48-51 (1974).
22. Health Insurance for the Aged Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965)
(presently codified as amended in scattered sections of 9, 42 U.S.C.).
23. 554 F.2d at 571 (citing H.R. REP. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965)).
24. See R. BLAIR & R. VOGEL, THE COST OF HEALTH INSURANCE ADMINISTRATION 82
(1975).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (Supp. V 1975). Qualified individuals who are otherwise ineligible
for Part A coverage may enroll in the program by paying monthly premiums. Id. § 1395i-2
(Supp. V 1975).
26. Id. § 1395i (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
27. 554 F.2d at 571 (citing S. REP. No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 179 (1972); S. REP. No.
404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 55-57 (1965); H.R. REP. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 47-49 (1965)).
ment. Id. at 77-80. But there are varying degrees of "publicness." Id. at 86. For instance, the
28. 42 U.S.C.A.-§§1395j-1395w (West 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1395k (1970 & Cum. Supp. 1975).
30. Id. § 1395o (Supp. V 1975). The other qualified United States residents aged 65 or
older who are eligible for Part A coverage include United States citizens and aliens lawfully
admitted for permanent residence who have resided in the United States for the 5 years
immediately preceding the month in which application for Part A enrollment has been made. Id.
§ 1395o(2).
31. Id. § 1395r (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
32. Id. § 1395w.
33. Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund. Id. § 1395t.
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risk of loss due to illness, the spreading of payments over time and over a
pool of participants, and the actuarially calculated self-supporting character
of the disbursing fund.34 On the other hand, the Part A provisions also
contain elements common to social insurance or welfare-compulsory
financing through designated taxes, 35 the non-deductibility of those taxes,
36
and government sponsorship.37 For dependency support test purposes, this
mixed composition of the Part A program makes two different lines of
authority relevant, one dealing with proceeds disbursed under insurance
plans and the other with social insurance or welfare receipts.
As a general rule, sums spent to defray medical expenses are con-
sidered part of an individual's support.38 However, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in Mawhinney v. Commissioner39 that
insurance premiums, rather than the proceeds paid under a private health
insurance policy, should be included in dependency support computations as
the cost of medical support. The Commissioner has formally adopted this
approach toward premiums and proceeds under private health insurance
plans. 4' Furthermore, the Commissioner has ruled that the voluntary pre-
miums Medicare participants pay for Part B coverage, rather than the
benefits disbursed under that program, should be included as support be-
cause Part B premiums "qualify as amounts paid for insurance covering
medical care." 41
34. 554 F.2d at 575. Part B contains similar elements. See text accompanying notes 28-33
supra.
35. The Commissioner argued in Turecamo that for § 152(a) purposes the compulsory
participation aspect of Part A made the program distinguishable from Part B, to which partici-
pants pay voluntary premiums as in private insurance plans. 554 F.2d at 572. The Commissioner
reasoned that Part A benefits should be treated as other social insurance or welfare receipts
rather than as insurance proceeds under § 152(a). Id. See generally authorities cited note 4
supra. The Second Circuit, however, relying on Congressional debates and pertinent commen-
tary, stated that this compulsory-voluntary dichotomy does not conclusively determine the
dependency support test consequences of Part A benefits. 554 F.2d at 572-73. The court found
that the different funding methods reflected, among other things, Congress' "desire to guaran-
tee the participation of those citizens sought to be protected and. . . recognition of the relative
ease of actuarially projecting hospital costs as compared to physicians' costs." Id. at 573
(footnotes omitted). The court also found that the unavailability of insurance coverage compa-
rable to Part B at competitive prices "practically compelled" eligible individuals to participate
in that government program. Id. at 574.
36. The Second Circuit found that the non-deductibility of the Medicare payroll tax, in
contrast to the I.R.C. § 213(e)(1)(C) deductibility of Part B premiums, was "without decisive
significance." 554 F.2d at 573 n.18. "'There is no necessary correlation between section 213
and sections 151 and 152.'" Id. (quoting Turecamo v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. at 728).
37. Id. at 575.
38. See Treas. Reg. § 1.152-1(a)(2)(i), T.D. 6231, 1957-1 C.B. 77, 83.
39. 355 F.2d 462 (3d Cir. 1966), aff'g per curiam 43 T.C. 443 (1965). But cf. Samples v.
United States, 226 F. Supp. 115 (N.D. Ga. 1963) (proceeds under group insurance plan
purchased by employer of beneficiary constitute support).
40. Rev. Rul. 64-223, 1964-2 C.B. 50.
41. Rev. Rul. 70-341, 1970-2 C.B. 31. This was the same ruling in which the Commissioner
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The implicit rationale of these authorities, recognized by the Second
Circuit, is that a "planned and rational relationship" between an individual
and the taxpayer who regularly contributes to that individual's support will
include the routine cost of maintaining medical insurance as the budgeted
support cost for medical expenses. 42 Moreover, the court observed that the
average person considers " 'insurance premiums plus unreimbursed pay-
ments for health care' " as his or her health costs. 43 Under this analysis,
treating large insurance payments as support distorts "economic reali-
ties."'
Social insurance or welfare disbursements, on the other hand, have
traditionally been treated as support under section 152(a).45 For example, in
Lutter v. Commissioner46 the Tax Court held that state medical assistance
grants and government payments to indigent parents with dependent chil-
dren constituted support provided by the state. Similarly, the cost of care in
a state mental institution has been treated as support. 47 The Commissioner
has also ruled that the amount received by a child under social security
survivors insurance was the beneficiary's contribution to support.48
It appears that the policy behind this approach to social insurance and
welfare disbursements under the dependency support test has never been
articulated by the courts or by the Commissioner. Indeed, treatment of
government largesse as support has sometimes been an automatic reflex.
49
Nevertheless, the common denominator among these cases and rulings
provides an analytical key. The disbursements involved constitute public
held that Part A-benefits should be included in dependency support computations. See note 14
supra.
42. 554 F.2d at 576.
43. Id. (quoting Turecamo v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. at 730 n. I (Wilbur, J., concurring)).
In Rev. Rul. 64-223, 1964-2 C.B. 50, the Commissioner stated:
Where the taxpayer or the individual is covered under a renewable term policy
which provides insurance against the cost of medical care. . . ,the policyholder will
be considered as having furnished the care since the policyholder, under a privately
financed medical insurance plan, is regarded as providing medical care for himself and
the other beneficiaries of the policy.
Id.
44. 554 F.2d at 576.
45. See authorities cited note 4 supra.
46. 61 T.C. 685 (1974), aff'd per curiam, 514 F.2d 1095 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
931 (1975).
47. Julia Pugisson, 27 T.C.M. (P-H) 896 (1958).
48. Rev. Rul. 57-344, 1957-2 C.B. 112. Attributing the contribution to the beneficiary is a
fiction that has been used when the payments have accrued to the beneficiary on account of
specific taxes, such as a social security payroll tax, paid by the beneficiary or on his or her
behalf. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-543, 1974-2 C.B. 39 (social security benefit payments to child of
disabled parent held child's contribution to his own support).
49. See, e.g., Roy B. Abbott, 23 T.C.M. (P-H) 171 (1954) (court included value of X-rays
and medical examinations furnished free by public health authorities and value of milk furnish-
ed by township in support computations).
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goods satisfying certain social wants.5" More specifically, the cases and
rulings all indirectly involve situations in which society, through the agency
of government, has provided special goods and services to certain members
of society-for example, the mentally ill51 and children of disabled par-
ents52-- whose needs have been inadequately served by the private sector.
The intended beneficiaries have commonly received assistance in the form
of items listed in the Treasury regulations as support.53 Concomitantly, the
financial burdens of taxpayers with a legal obligation or a self-perceived
moral obligation to support these beneficiaries have been eased. Recogni-
tion of these facts by the courts and the Commissioner may explain the
traditional section 152(a) approach to government benefits, a tack that is
decidedly unfavorable to the taxpayer who indirectly benefits from govern-
ment disbursements and then subsequently attempts to deduct dependency
claims.
Despite the Part A program's similarities to private insurance,' this
component of the Medicare system is a public good. Medicare was created
because private enterprise had failed to provide adequate health insurance
for the elderly.55 Contributions have in fact been made by the beneficiaries
themselves or on their behalf through the payroll tax, but the Part A
insurance pool is also funded through such other sources as the employers
50. A public good is one whose production has external or spill-over effects. D. HYMAN,
THE ECONOMICS OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTIvrrY 73-74 (1973). In other words, public goods are
goods that, if produced for any one member of society, yield benefits to other members of
society. A pure public good is collectively consumed by all members of society, none of whom
can be prevented from taking advantage of, or otherwise benefiting from, the particular service
provided. Each member's consumption of such a good does not reduce the consumption
available to other members. Id. at 74. National defense is an example of a pure public good.
Efficient production of pure public goods usually requires collective action through the govern-
ment. Id. at 77-80. But there are varying degrees of "publicness." Id. at 86. For instance, the
quantity of a certain good may be limited, but its consumption by some members may satisfy
wants of others who do not participate in consumption. See id. at 86. The provision of food and
housing to the poor by private charity may satisfy the social wants of other members of society
who desire that no one lack the necessities of life. A governmentally provided health service
constitutes another such "quasi-public good." Id. The government may or may not produce
any given quasi-public good, depending on how satisfactorily the private sector produces that
good. See id. at 85-90. For the purposes of this Note, the distinction between public goods and
quasi-public goods is needlessly technical. Use of the term "public good" herein will refer to
any good that the government provides whenever the private sector is incapable of producing it
or when the private sector provides it in a manner that is deemed unsatisfactory. See generally
A. PAPANDREOU, PATERNALISTIC CAPITALISM 31-32 (1972).
Public goods are most commonly financed through taxation. T. SCITOVSKY, WELFARE AND
COMPETITION 261 (rev. ed. 1971).
51. See, e.g., Julia Pugisson, 27 T.C.M. (P-H) 896 (1958).
52. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-543, 1974-2 C.B. 39.
53. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.152-I(a)(2)(i), T.D. 6231, 1957-1 C.B. 77, 83, with Roy B.
Abbott, 23 T.C.M. (P-H) 171 (1954).
54. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
55. R. STEVENS & R. STEVENS, supra note 21, at 50.
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excise tax. 56 Thus, the cost of Part A coverage is probably borne by a larger
segment of society than directly benefits under the program.5 7 This aspect of
Part A makes the program distinguishable from private health insurance
plans in which premiums paid by participants constitute a truly self-suffi-
cient pool. Under these plans, individuals who pay premiums provide
adequate funds collectively to enable underwriters to defray covered medi-
cal support expenses of the beneficiaries.
58
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit in Turecamo focused on the Part A
program's similarities to private insurance, especially the regular payments
for financial protection against risk of loss. 59 In concluding that Part A
benefits, like private health insurance proceeds, were excludible from sec-
tion 152(a) computations, the Second Circuit attempted to answer a question
that had been left open by the Tax Court. The Tax Court had held that there
was no proper basis for distinguishing Part A benefits from payments under
private health insurance plans and under the Part B Medicare program. But
it explicitly left open the question whether all such payments should be
included as part of an individual's support under section 152(a). This
question accentuated the weakness of the line of authority holding that
health insurance proceeds are excludible from dependency support computa-
tions and suggested the conceivability of the Commissioner's reversing
himself with regard to section 152(a) treatment of Part B benefits and private
health insurance proceeds.
61
The first rationale provided by the Second Circuit went no further than
the Tax Court. It merely echoed the lower court's conclusion that the
56. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
57. It is at least theoretically possible, however, that the incidence of the employers tax is
shifted to labor through the employers' reduction of wages in response to the tax. J. PECHMAN,
FEDERAL TAX POLICY 210-11 (3d ed. 1977). The economic model on which theories of this sort
are based, however, assumes rational behavior in labor markets and disregards the effect of
collective bargaining on wages. Id. at 211. The tax is so general and so many other factors are
involved that it is impossible to prove conclusively that the incidence of the employers tax rests
solely on labor. J. WINFREY, PUBLIC FINANCE: PUBLIC CHOICES AND THE PUBLIC ECONOMY 447
(1973). In reality, it is also possible that all or part of both the employers and payroll taxes is
shifted to consumers. J. PECHMAN, supra at 211. Labor unions resist wage cuts and may
succeed in persuading management to raise prices and wages by amounts sufficient to offset the
taxes. Id.
58. Part B of the Medicare system, like Part A, also differs from private health insurance
plans. Part B is a public good financed to a great extent with public funds. See text accompany-
ing notes 31-32 supra. For instance, in 1976, 58.8% of Part B Medicare funds came from the
general revenues. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF H.E.W., 40 Soc. SECURI-
TY BULL., No. 4, 14 (1977). Thus, the premiums paid by Part B participants by no means
provide a self-sufficient insurance pool to pay for covered medical expenses.
59. 554 F.2d at 575.
60. 64 T.C. at 728.
61. See [1975] TAX COORDINATOR (RIA) A-3108.6.
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various payments were legally indistinguishable.62 In explaining its second
ground, however, the court answered to its own satisfaction the question left
open by the Tax Court. Relying in part on a footnote in a concurring opinion
to the Tax Court's decision,63 the Second Circuit determined that receipt of
payments under the Part A plan "interrupts but does not alter" the estab-
lished financial relationship. between an individual and the taxpayer who
pays most of that individual's other expenses.64 The court recognized "that
certain providers of hospital services received more in Medicare payments
from the Federal government . . . than Mrs. Kavanaugh received in sup-
port from the Turecamos," but it stated that this fact did not change the
"basic financial relationship" between the taxpayers and the beneficiary.
65
On this basis, the court concluded that all health insurance proceeds, Part A
benefits included, should be disregarded in dependency support computa-
tions.66 Thus, if only by way of dictum, Turecamo adds further legitimacy
to the authorities holding that disbursements under health insurance plans do
not constitute support for section 152(a) purposes.
67
As a matter of tax symmetry, it is at least arguable that the result in
Turecamo is a good one. As oveiiapping components of a closely coor-
dinated system, the two Medicare programs, Parts A and B, are nearly
indistinguishable in light of economic principles.68 As the Commissioner
has decided that benefits under Part B, like proceeds disbursed under private
health plans, should not be treated as support, it might be argued that Part A
benefits should be dealt with similarly. The Second Circuit, following a
similar line of reasoning, marked the Commissioner's concession that Part B
benefits were excludible from dependency support computations69 and em-
phasized the virtual indistinguishability of the two programs.
70
Regardless of this concession, 7' the similarities between Parts A and B,
62. Compare 554 F.2d at 568-75 with 64 T.C. at 722-29.
63. See 554 F.2d at 576 (quoting 64 T.C. at 730 n. 1 (Wilbur, J., concurring)).
64. id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 568, 576.
67. For a discussion of these authorities, see text accompanying notes 39-41 supra.
68. See note 58 and text accompanying notes 54-58 supra.
69. 554 F.2d at 568.
70. See id. at 572-74.
71. The Commissioner's concession on the treatment of Part B benefits, regardless of its
merits, did not amount to a constraint on the judicial decision in Turecamo. See 64T.C. at 739-
40 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting). The precise issue in this case involved only the § 152(a)
treatment of Part A benefits. See id. at 740. Moreover, the concession came in the form of a
revenue ruling. A revenue ruling issued to a taxpayer on the tax consequences of a particular
transaction yields a holding with respect to that transaction only. IRS Statement of Procedural
Rules, 26 C.F.R. § 601.201(1)(6) (1977). Revenue rulings are revocable and cannot be asserted
to estop the Internal Revenue Service in subsequent cases. See id. § 601.201(1)(1). Hence, the
1978]
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and the similarities between these Medicare programs and private health
insurance,72 Part A benefits do not have to be treated as payments under
private health insurance plans in the dependency support context. The Part
A program certainly involves regular payments by the participants for
specified protection against risk of loss, a "classic characteristic of insur-
ance," 73 but the reasons for treating Part A benefits in accordance with
traditional section 152(a) treatment of social insurance or welfare disburse-
ments seem far more compelling. Part A insurance is different from private
health insurance in one respect that is crucial for section 152(a) purposes:
participants in the Part A program do not themselves provide adequate
support through the amounts paid under the employees payroll tax, their
"premiums," to defray the cost of covered medical expenses. 74 The govern-
ment in its role as underwriter provides additional financing through taxes
on nonparticipants. 75 This classic characteristic of social insurance or wel-
fare is an aspect of Part A that the Second Circuit failed to deal with in
Turecamo beyond the simple recognition that the levies on nonparticipants
are sources of revenue for the Part'A program's trust fund.76 The strong
economic bond between Part A and other, government programs, the bene-
fits of which have been treated as support, should be the determinative
factor with regard to section 152(a) treatment of Part A benefits.
77
Finally, the Second Circuit's assertion that Part A benefits do not alter
an individual's financial dependency on a taxpayer 78 is perplexing. Medi-
Commissioner's ruling on the § 152(a) treatment of Part B benefits has dubious significance in a
subsequent case involving Part A benefits alone.
72. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
73. 554 F.2d at 575. The Second Circuit found this feature of Part A to be the "most
significant in determining the section 152(a) support test consequences" of benefits disbursed
under this program. Id.
74. See text accompanying notes 56-58 supra.
75. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
76. The court did, however, distinguish between Part A and social insurance or welfare on
the basis of the former's exclusive availability to defray the cost of specified medical expenses.
See 554 F.2d at 575. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit pointed out
in Lutter v. Commissioner, 514 F.2d 1095, 1096 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 931 (1975),
however, certain state-federal welfare payments to indigent parents are exclusively applicable
to uses in the best interests of the recipients' dependent children. Even if the Second Circuit's
distinction had been valid, it would not undermine the crucial economic bases for classifying
the Part A program as social insurance or welfare. See text accompanying notes 55-58, 74-75
supra.
77. The foregoing analysis is not intended to imply that the value of supportive benefits
derived from all public goods must be included in dependency support computations. For
example, exclusion of the value of public education might be justified because of uncertainties
with regard to valuation, even though education is included as a support item under Treas. Reg.
§ 1. 152-l(a)(2)(i), T.D. 6231, 1957-1 C.B. 77, 83. The cash value of Part A benefits, on the other
hand, is easily ascertainable as is the value of social security benefits and welfare disburse-
ments.
78. See 544 F.2d at 576.
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care reduces an individual's dependency with regard to medical expenses in
much the same way that social security benefits reduce dependency for other
support expenses. It effectively eliminates not only substantial expenses that
the taxpayer might otherwise have to pay but also the need to procure private
health insurance for the Medicare beneficiary. The taxpayer may still pay
the bulk of the Medicare beneficiary's remaining expenses, but the taxpay-
er's total responsibility to that person seems unquestionably to be diminish-
ed in proportion to the Medicare coverage provided by the government.
The Turecamo decision may be explained as a function of both the Part
A program's similarity to private health insurance and the Commissioner's
concession with regard to section 152(a) treatment of Part B benefits. If
viewed as having such a limited holding, Turecamo will have little or no
impact on treatment of other government disbursements under the depen-
denLy support test.79 However, by allowing exclusion of supportive govern-
ment benefits with easily ascertainable cash value,80 the Second Circuit has
hindered development of coherent guidelines for determining the section
152(a) status of benefits disbursed-, under government programs. 81 The
court's fixation on superficial "economic realities" 82 diverts attention away
from sound economic principles. It is thus conceivable that Turecamo could
contribute to other deviations from traditional section 152(a) treatment of
government benefits.
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79. This case's significance may be limited even more severely. Although the Internal
Revenue Service may voluntarily decide to comply with Turecamo in its future treatment of
Part A benefits, this case does not invalidate the revenue ruling that these government disburse-
ments constitute support. See J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 15-16 (2d ed. 1973). The
Second Circuit's holding in Turecamo merely binds the Service with respect to § 152(a)
treatment of the Part A benefits in that case. See id. Because the Service must administer the
federal income tax uniformly throughout the nation, it adheres to the view that it is bound only
by Supreme Court decisions as a matter of precedent. Id. at 16. Thus, the Revenue Service may
continue to litigate this issue.
80. See note 77 supra.
81. The Commissioner is equally blameworthy in this respect due to the decision that Part
A and Part B benefits were to be treated differently under the dependency support test. See
generally Rev. Rul. 70-341, 1970-2 C.B. 31. These two components of the Medicare system are
nearly indistinguishable. See note 58 and text accompanying notes 54-58 supra. This close
similarity dictates similar § 152(a) treatment of benefits disbursed under the two programs.
82. See 554 F.2d at 576.
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